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Optimism  Versus  Pessmism:  An  Exploratory  Analysis  of  China  in  Zambian  Media    Bob  Wekesa    University  of  the  Witwatersrand’s  Wits  China  Africa  Reporting  Project  and  Communication  University  of  China    The   huge   interest   in   Zambia-­‐China   relations   globally,   both   in   academia   and   popular   press,  inspires  several   inquisitions.  How  have  these  relations  changed  and  panned  out  in  the  present,  from  a  Zambian  media  perspective?  Would  a  Zambian  media  approach  help  provide  insights  into  the   ebb   and   flow   of   perceptions   about   China   inside   Zambia?   What   can   we   gather   from   the  Zambian  media  on  the  September  2011  regime  change  in  Zambia  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  China’s  engagement?  In   other   words,   how   did   Zambian  media   craft   perceptions   on   and   of   China   in   the   era   of   late  president  Michael  Chilufya  Sata’s  leadership?  To  answer  these  questions,  this  exploratory  study  applies  a   framing  theoretical  approach  to  analysis  of  content   from  three  Zambian  news  media:  Daily  Mail,  The  Post  Online  and  Zambian  Watchdog.  The  objective  is  to  offer  perspectives  from  this  sample  of  the  Zambian  media  scene  with  a  view  to  determining  optimistic  versus  pessimistic  perceptions   on   China’s   image.   Selected   international  media   are   included   for   a   transient,   loose  comparative  comment.  The  news   framing  analysis   is   fore  grounded  by   literature   review   to  set  the  background  and  context  in  which  the  selected  media  reported  China  between  January  2013  and   January   2014.   After   a   systematic   content   review,   this   article   concludes   that   the   three  newspapers   frame   China   in   more   optimistic   than   pessimistic   terms.   The   article   concludes   by  arguing  for  the  need  for  audience-­‐based  fieldwork  as  an  important  next  step.  _____________________________________________________________________________________________________    Introduction    Even  the  most  cursory  of  glances  at  the  Africa-­‐China  relations  would  yield  Zambia  as  one  among  few  other  African  countries  to  have  attracted  an  above-­‐average  amount  of  media  reporting  and  scholarly  research  output.  Alden  (2007:72)  for  instance  characterizes  Zambia  as  ‘China’s  perfect  storm’,  while   Sautman  and  Yan   (2010:746)   reckon  Zambia   as   one  of   the   countries   ‘held  up   in  Western  discourse   [of  which  media   is  all  pervading]  as  exemplars  of  negativity  about  China   in  Africa’.      Park   (2013:153)   points   out   that   Zambia   is   one   of   the   countries   where   ‘Chinese   in   Africa   are  becoming  targets  of  increased  anti-­‐Chinese  sentiment  led  by  opposition  political  parties  and  civil  society   organizations’.   Noted   Africa-­‐China   scholar   Deborah   Brautigam   explains   her   choice   of  Zambia   (as  well   as   Tanzania)   as   the   site   for   her   fieldwork   on   the   basis   that   its   relations  with  China  are  long-­‐standing  (Brautigam  2009:20).  For  both  Zambia  and  Tanzania,  bilateral  relations  with  China  were  established  immediately  after  their  independence  from  British  colonial  rule  in  1964  and  1962,  respectively.    A   viewing   of   television  news  programmes,   documentaries,   and   films   on   the  Africa-­‐China   topic  available  on  YouTube,  the  open  source  video  content  platform,  show  generous  space  allocated  to  Zambia  relative  to  other  African  countries  in  a  good  number  of  the  episodes.  Focus  on  Zambia  by  global   broadcasters   can   be   seen   in   the   documentary,   The   Chinese   are   Coming   (BBC,   March  2011),   as  an  example  among  many  others   in  which  China   is  portrayed  as   inimical   to  Zambia’s  interests.   In   balanced  productions   such   as  Al   Jazeera’s  People   and  Power:  King  Cobra   and   the  Dragon   (November  2012)  and  When  China  Met  Africa   (February  2011)1  one  sees  a  dichotomy                                                                                                                               1  Accessible  at  www.whenchinametafrica.com/distrify  
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between  China  as   force   for  good   in  Zambia  and  a  more  deleterious  side  of   things  on   the  other  hand.  Zambia  is  equally  a  popular  subject  in  proliferating  blogs  and  podcasts  on  Africa-­‐China  two  of  the  perhaps  most  significant  ones  being  Cowries  and  Rice2  and  China  Africa  Project3.    The   huge   interest   in   China-­‐Zambia   relations   globally,   both   in   academia   and   popular   press,  inspires  several   inquisitions.  How  have   these  relations  changed  and  panned  out   in   the  present  from  a  Zambian  media  perspective?  Would  a  Zambian  media  approach  help  provide  insights  into  the   ebb   and   flow   of   perceptions   about   China   inside   Zambia?   What   can   we   gather   from   the  Zambian  media  on  the  September  2011  regime  change  in  Zambia  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  Chinese  engagement?  In  other  words,  how  did  Zambian  media  craft  perceptions  on  and  of  China  in  the  era  of  former  president  Michael  Chilufya  Sata’s  leadership?    Historical  Background    Why   is   China   –   at   least   in   some   section   of   Africa-­‐China   intelligentsia   -­‐   portrayed   as   an   all-­‐weather,   long-­‐standing,   south-­‐south   partner   of   Zambia   and   why   is   this   so   important   today?  Along   with   Tanzania,   Zambia   is   one   of   the   sub-­‐Saharan   African   countries   where   China’s  engagement   registered   a   pioneering   Chinese   presence   with   the   Chinese   state/party,   under  Chairman  Mao  Zedong  providing  material  and  ideological  support  (Brautigam,  2009).  This  was  in   the   form   of   the   well-­‐acknowledged   construction   of   the   1800-­‐kilometre   Tanzania-­‐Zambia  railway  (from  Dar  es  Salaam  on   the   Indian  Ocean  coast   to  Kapiri  Mposhi   in  northern  Zambia’s  copper-­‐belt,  between  1967  and  1975).      Zambia  is  a  landlocked  country  and  copper  has  been  its  economic  lifeline  since  the  period  before  independence.   At   independence,   Zambia’s   neighbours,   namely,   Zimbabwe,   Angola,   and   South  Africa   remained   under   colonial   regimes   (apartheid   regime   in   the   case   of   South   Africa).   The  colonial  regimes  in  Zambia’s  neighbourhood  and  which  had  access  to  international  waters  were  unfriendly   to   the   newly   independent   nation.   This  meant   that   Zambia  was   hard   put   exporting  copper  –  the  lifeblood  for  a  fledgling  nation  –  through  the  hostile  neighbouring  territories  and  on  to   the   international   markets.   Tanzania   was   the   only   Zambian   neighbour   under   a   friendly  independent  African  regime.  Thus  Tanzania  was   the  only   feasible  route   through  which  Zambia  could  export  its  copper,  but  the  challenge  was  the  uncharted  territory  marked  by  poor  transport  infrastructure  between  the  Copperbelt  hinterlands  in  Zambia  and  the  Indian  Ocean  port  of  Dar  es   Salaam   in   Tanzania.   It   is   in   this   context   that   China’s   construction   of   the   Tanzania-­‐Zambia  railway  was  a  crucial  undertaking  and  this  is  the  springboard  of  the  historical  solidarity  between  Zambia  and  China  (Shinn  and  Eisenman,  2012:324).      Over   and   above   the   construction   of   the   railway,   China   established   bases   in   Zambia   for   the  training   of   liberation   fighters   in   southern   Africa   nations   that   suffered   delayed   independence.  Further,   close   ties   were   cultivated   through   China’s   construction   of   the   United   National  Independence  Party’s  (UNIP)  headquarters  in  Lusaka  in  1987  (Shinn  and  Eisenman,  2012:  325).  As   it   is,   therefore,   China   is   anything   but   a   new,   twenty-­‐first   century   player   in   Zambia’s   socio-­‐economic  space,  although  it  trailed  western  powers,  particularly  Britain,  which  set  that  base  in  Zambia’s  Copperbelt  in  1928  (Human  Rights  Watch,  2011:  17).    Under  Zambia’s  founding  president,  Kenneth  Kaunda,  the  copper  mining  sector  was  nationalised  in   the   late  1960s  with   the  state-­‐owned  Zambia  Consolidated  Copper  Mines  (ZCCM)  as   the  sole  copper  management  entity  (Spilsbury,  2012).  A  combination  of  factors  however  led  to  Kaunda’s  ouster   from   power   via   democratic   means   in   1991.   It   is   largely   acknowledged   that   Kaunda’s                                                                                                                               2  Accessible  at  www.cowriesrice.blogspot.com  3  Accessible  at  www.chinaafricaproject.com  
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political   fortunes   tumbled   on   the   back   of   the   collapse   of   the   copper-­‐based   economy   (Human  Rights  Watch,  2011;  Spilsbury,  2012).    Chinese  leaders  wasted  no  time  in  embracing  the  regime  of  Zambia’s  new  leader  in  1991,  the  late  Fredrick  Chiluba  (subsuming  political  party   ties),  and  soon  China  entered   the  Zambian  mining  sector   as   part   of   the   ensuing,   ‘ruinous’   IMF-­‐World   Bank-­‐backed   privatisation   of   the   mining  sector,   better   known   as   Structural   Adjustment   Programs   (SAPs)   (Sautman   and   Yan,   2007:78;  Spilsbury,  2012:  251-­‐52;  Shinn  and  Eisenman,  2012:325-­‐26;  Alden,  2007:73).  At   the   inaugural  Forum  on  China  Africa  Cooperation  (FOCAC)  in  Beijing  in  2000,  Chiluba  apportioned  blame  for  the  poor  state  of  his  country’s  economy  on  the  West  (which  is  sometimes  bundled  with  Bretton-­‐Woods  Institutions)  ostensibly  in  the  context  of  welcoming  Chinese  investors  who  were  making  forays  into  the  Zambian  sphere  (Spilsbury,  2012:  253;  Kopinski  and  Polus,  2011:184).    Chinese  Investments  in  Zambia    The  point  in  time  during  which  Zambia  was  shifting  from  a  nationalised  economy  to  a  liberal  one  coincided  with  a  period  during  Chinese  companies  were  stepping  up  a  search  for  opportunities  abroad   in  what   is  known  as   the   ‘going  out  policy’.   In   turn,   it  has  been  pointed  out   that  China’s  going   out   policy   had   the   objective   of   providing   a   market   for   Chinese   products,   improving  resource   security,   enabling   technology   transfer,   and   promoting   research   and   development  (Brautigam,   2009:74-­‐75;   Human   Rights   Watch,   2011:14).   One   company   that   best   illustrates  Chinese  interests  in  Zambia  –  both  on  the  positive  and  negative  continuum  –  is  the  state-­‐owned  China  Non-­‐Ferrous  Metals  Mining  Corporation  (CNMC).      CNMC  purchased  an   initially   government-­‐owned  mine   in  Chambishi,  northern  Zambia   in  1998  and  operates  it  under  the  name  Non-­‐Ferrous  China  Africa  (NFCA).  After  initial  investments,  the  Chambishi  mine  was   revived   in   2003   after   being   out   of   operation   for  more   than   a   decade.   In  quick   succession,   CNMC   opened   four  more  mining   and   related   operations:   Sino  Metals   Leach  Zambia   (Sino   Metals),   a   copper   processing   plant,   2006;   Zambia-­‐China   Economic   and   Trade  Cooperation   Zone   (ZCCZ),   also   in   Chambishi,   became   the   first   special   economic   zone   in  Africa  with  an  extension  in  Lusaka,  2007;  Chambishi  Copper  Smelter  (CCS),  2009;  and  China  Luanshya  Mine  (CLM),  an  underground,  open-­‐cast  mining  operation,  2009  (Human  Rights  Watch,  2011:3;  21;   Spilsbury,   2012:   255;   Shinn   and   Eisenman,   2012:   325;   Brautigam,   2009:   82;   201;   Alden,  2007:  73).    Such  is  the  strength  of  Zambia-­‐China  partnership  that  the  China  Development  Bank’s  and  China  Export-­‐Import  Bank’s  have  a  strong  presence  in  Zambia  providing  low  interest  loans  for  a  host  of  projects   (particularly   infrastructural).   The   China   Development   Bank   established   an   office   in  Lusaka  in  1997  (Brautigam,  2010:  8;  Shinn  and  Eisenman,  2012:325).  China  has  also  cancelled  a  number  of  Zambian   loans  (Africa-­‐Asia  Confidential,  2013:  34;  Shinn  and  Eisenman,  2012:  324-­‐328).    Controversial  Events  and  Issues  in  Zambia       That  labour  relations  generally  constitute  the  epitome  of  harsh  judgment  on  the  China-­‐in-­‐Zambia  discourse  is  hardly  contestable.  Literature  however  shows  four  incidents  as  standing  out  in  the  defining  of  the  negative  dimension  of  the  otherwise  embraced  Chinese  investment,  all  of  them  in  the  mining  sector.  The  most  tragic  of  these  is  the  2005  explosion  at  the  CNMC/NFCA  Chambishi  explosives  manufacturing  plant  where  many  Zambian  workers  died  –  in  literature;  the  number  varies   from  46   to  51   (Human  Rights  Watch  2011;  Spilsbury  2012;   Shinn  and  Eisenman,  2012;  Brautigam,   2009;   Alden,   2007).   The   second   incident   relates   to   the   2006   riots   in   the   same  Chambishi   area   that   ended   with   the   shooting   of   five   Zambian   miners   allegedly   by   a   Chinese  manager.  In  the  third  incident,  11  workers  were  shot  at  the  privately  owned  Collum  Coal  Mines,  
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(which  though  Australian  owned,  has  strong  links  with  Chinese  interests),  in  the  southern  region  town  of  Sinazongwe.  Fourthly,  a  Chinese  manager  was  killed  at  the  same  Collum  mines  in  August  2012   (Human   Rights   Watch,   2011:22-­‐23;   Shinn   and   Eisenman,   2012:325;   Alden,   2007:74;  Brautigam,   2009:5-­‐6).   Conflated   with   myriad   other   issues,   these   incidents   shone   media,   civil  society,   and   scholarship   spotlight   on   China   in   Zambia   like   nowhere   else   on   the   continent.  Distinguishing   circumstances   under   which   Chinese   interests   have   been   targeted   in   Africa   as  falling   in   the   categories  of   criminal,   labour,  political,   and  maritime/piracy  motivated   (Yun  Sun  2014:9-­‐10)   suggests   the   Zambian   case   falls   in   the   labour   disputes   category,   although   as   the  literature  makes  clear,  the  labour  disputes  wend  into  political  discourse.       While   the  Chinese   involvement   in   the  Zambian  copper  and  coal-­‐mining   sector  draws   the  most  analysis,  Chinese  investments  in  other  sectors  also  make  it  to  the  controversially  framed  list  of  issues.   The   Chinese   are   seen   being   on-­‐and-­‐off   in   terms   of   support   for   the  Mulungushi   Textile  Corporation   from   the   mid   1980s   to   present   (Alden,   2007:73;   Eliassen,   2012:84;   Shinn   and  Eisenman,   2012:325).   Chinese   funding   for   various   infrastructure   projects   such   as   China   Exim  Bank’s   funding   of   the   Lower   Kafue   Gorge   Dam,   are   seen   as   deleterious   for   the   environment  (Strange  et  al.,  2013:10-­‐11).  The  number  of  Chinese  migrants  is  seen  as  disconcerting,  including  their   failure   to   assimilate   in   Zambia   as  well   as   the   allegedly   poor   quality   of   products   and   the  potential   of   importation   of   manufactured   products   from   China   to   undermine   Zambia’s  manufacturing   sector   (Spilsbury,   2012:238,   257;   Alden,   2007:48;   73;   Jura   and   Kaluzynska,  2013:96;   Lee,   2009).   Chinese   state-­‐owned   and  private   companies   investing   in   the   agricultural  sector  are  seen  as  improving  Zambia’s  food  security  but  also  introducing  competition  with  local  farmers  (Shinn  and  Eisenman,  2012:138;  Brautigam,  2009:254-­‐55,  266-­‐69).      Arising  out  of  these  engagements,  various  scholars  suggest  a  paradox  in  China-­‐Zambia  relations.  This   is   best   exemplified   by   the   Human   Rights   Watch   report’s   binary   characterisation   of   ‘the  Chinese’  as:   ‘good  investors,  but  bad  employers’  (Human  Rights  Watch,  2011:3;  30-­‐31).  In  June  2011,   former  U.S.  Secretary  of  State  Hillary  Clinton  chastised  China  for  pursuing  a  neo-­‐colonial  agenda  in  Africa.  She  made  the  remarks  on  the  sidelines  of  an  African  Growth  and  Opportunity  Act   (AGOA)   conference   in   the   Zambian   capital,   Lusaka   (see   Bloomberg,   2011).   The   charge   of  Chinese  neo-­‐colonialism  in  Zambia  has  been  woven  into  ‘human  rights’  issues  relating  to  labour  relations  and  encompassing  low  pay,  excessive  working  hours,  poor  health  and  safety  standards,  frequency  of  accidents,  environmental  destruction,  barring  workers  from  joining  labour  unions,  summary   dismissals,   etc.   (Human   Rights   Watch,   2011:4;   Strange   et   al.,   2013:10;   Salisbury,  2012:238).  According   to  Shinn  and  Eisenman  (2012:325),   the  negative  perceptions  emanating  from  the  above  mentioned  challenges  have  left  ‘a  legacy  of  ill  will’.      But  on   the  upward   looking   continuum,   it   has  been  noted   that  Chinese   capital   played  a  pivotal  role  in  breathing  life  into  some  of  the  mines  that  had  been  abandoned  by  previous  investors,  for  instance   the   2002   departure   of   Anglo   American   (Moyo,   2012:150).   Chinese   capital   is   seen   to  have   helped   with   revamping   the   efficiency   of   mining   technologies   as   well   as   expanding  operations  (Human  Rights  Watch,  2011:30).    China  in  Zambian  Politics    Sautman   and   Yan   (2010:749)   attribute   ‘international   media   depiction   of   Zambians   as   anti-­‐Chinese’   on   Michael   Sata,   during   his   opposition   leadership   period.   It   has   been   well   noted   in  literature  that  in  challenging  his  also  deceased  competitor,  Levy  Mwanawasa,  for  the  presidency  in  2006,   the   late  president  Sata  mobilised,   launched,  and  sustained  a  scathing,   fierce  attack  on  the  Chinese,  taking  advantage  of  ‘…  [of]  disenfranchised,  fiery  hearts  that  were  already  burning  with   anti-­‐Chinese   sentiment’   (Sautman  and  Yan,   2010:749-­‐52;  Human  Rights  Watch,   2011:26;  Spilsbury,  2012:264).  
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One   of   Sata’s   often   quoted   statements   on   the   campaign   trail   was   the   reference   to   Chinese   as  ‘infesters’   rather   than   ‘investors’   (Strange   et   al.,   2013:6;   BBC,   2011).   He   framed   the   ‘China  question’  as   ‘Zambia   is  becoming  a  province  –  no  a  district  –  of  China’  (Alden,  2007:75).  Shinn  andEisenman  (2012:72)  point  out  that  ‘in  the  run-­‐up  to  Zambia’s  2006  presidential  elections  the  CPC   (Chinese   Communist   Party)   publicly   supported   the   MMD   (Movement   for   Multiparty  Democracy)’  –  the  latter  party  being  the  one  Sata’s  Patriotic  Front  (PF)  was  campaigning  against.  Observers   of   China-­‐Zambia   relations   identified   a   change   in   both   Mwanawasa   and   Beijing’s  policies   –   somewhat   improved   labour   practices   for   instance   –   in   view   of   the   anti-­‐Chinese  sentiments  during  the  2006  electioneering  (Spilsbury,  2012:260;  Fraser  and  Larmer,  2007:611-­‐12).      Probably  to  the  alarm  of  the  Chinese  officials  in  Beijing,  Sata  went  so  far  as  to  touch  a  raw  nerve  by   pledging   recognition   for   Taiwan’s   independence   from  Mainland  China   ‘alarming’,   given   the  never-­‐ending   Beijing-­‐Taipei   decades-­‐long   sovereignty   tug-­‐of-­‐war   (Brautigam,   2009:151).  Chinese  ambassador  to  Zambia  at  the  time,  Li  Baodong,  dispensed  with  diplomatic  etiquette  to  threaten   China’s   withdrawal   from   Zambia   in   the   event   Sata   won.   While   concluding   that  ambassador   Li’s   public   altercations   with   Sata   amounted   to   ‘a   political   misstep’,   Shinn   and  Eisenman   (2012:327)   also   imply   Beijing   may   have   given   tacit   approval   to   this   diplomatic  incident   in   view   of   Li   being   allowed   to   stay   on   ‘for   a   face   saving   period   and   then   (being)  transferred  to  a  senior  position  in  Geneva’.  In  the  end,  Sata  and  the  PF  party  lost  to  Mwanawasa’s  MMD  at  the  2006  plebiscite  and  the  matter  went  to  the  back  banner.  Nonetheless,  the  fact  that  Sata’s   PF   emerged   victorious   in   the   Copperbelt   indicated   that   the   anti-­‐Chinese   message   had  indeed   sunk   in   areas   of   Chinese   investment   heft   (Human   Rights   Watch   2011:26;   Shinn   and  Eisenman,  2012:73  and  Brautigam,  2009:150-­‐51).    Mwanawasa  –  a  staunch  supporter  of  Chinese  investments  in  Zambia  –  passed  on  in  2008  (with  former  Chinese  foreign  minister  Yang  Jiechi  attending  the  state  funeral)  and  his  deputy,  Rupiah  Banda,  took  the  reins  of  power  in  an  acting  capacity  in  lieu  of  a  snap  presidential  election  held  in  October   the   same   year.   Banda   won   the   election   with   a   waver   thin   margin;   Sata   lamented  electoral  malpractices  for  his  loss.  But  ‘King  Cobra’,  as  tenacious  Sata  was  known,  was  not  done  with   presidential   ambitions   and   would   emerge   victorious   in   the   subsequent   elections   of  September  2011.      A  distinction  has  been  made  between  the  Sata  of  2006,  whose  political  stock  in  trade  was  to  lay  Zambian  economic  woes  at   the   feet  of   ‘the  Chinese’,   and   the  much  more  mellowed  Sata  of   the  2008  and  2011  election,  who  though  still  critical  of  the  economic  model,  was  less  acerbic  of  the  Chinese  (Human  Rights  Watch,  2011:27;  Spilsbury,  2012:261;  Carmody  et  al.,  2012:224;  Shinn  and  Eisenman,  2012:327-­‐28).  There  are  those  who  surmise  that  Sata’s  anti-­‐Chinese  rhetoric  of  2006  had  such  a  staying  power  as  to  contribute  to  his  2011  victory  (Spilsbury,  2012:238).  Many  recent  works  and  journalistic  pieces  have  concluded  that  Sata  embraced  a  pro-­‐China  stance  once  he   became   president   (Spilsbury,   2012:263;   Africa   Asia   Confidential,   2013:1),   although   he  occasionally  made  nationalistic  or  patriotic  moves  (Shinn  and  Eisenman,  2012:328).      Some   suggested   that   Sata’s   anti-­‐Chinese   rhetoric   was   no   more   than   the   antics   of   a   populist  politician  whose  criticism  was  meant   to  satiate  a  burning  hunger  power  (Spilsbury,  2012:259;  263;   Fraser   and  Larmer,   2007).  According   to   Spilsbury   (2012:264)   citing   a   local   newspaper   –  The  Post  –   ‘Sata  (was)  a  populist  who  (would)  say  what  he  (thought)  newspapers  want(ed)  to  hear…he  (had)  no  morals  to  defend,  no  principles  to  fight  for’.      What  Communication  Scholars  Say    The   preceding   review   suggests   Zambia-­‐China   relations   have   been   studied   with   a   measure   of  depth   from   economic   and   geopolitical   perspectives.   The  missing   link   for   the   current   paper   is  
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communications/media  review.  Wekesa  (2013:27)  points  out  that  Zambia  was  the  second  most  ‘talked  about’  country   in  East  African  newspapers   in  2011  with  respects   to  China  (after  Sudan  and  followed  by  Zimbabwe;  Wekesa,  2013a:27).  This  is  consistent  with  social  science  literature  indicative   of   Zambia   as   a   hotspot   for   the   overall   China-­‐in-­‐Africa   phenomenon.   Citing   Chinese  migration   and   reclusiveness,   Sautman   and  Yan   (2010:735-­‐36)   found   that   Zambia   is   a   country  where   negative   sentiments   against   China   are   comparatively   higher,   though   this   should   not   be  confused   with   Zambians   being   more   negative   than   positive   about   China.   Indeed   the   survey  pointed  out  both  ‘a  beneficial  and  harmful’  sentiment  about  China  but  with  approval  supplanting  disapproval  ratings  (Sautman  and  Yan,  2010:738).  Yu-­‐Shan  Wu  (2013:17)  brings  in  a  proximate  view  but  from  a  Chinese  social  media  perspective,  in  the  sense  that  the  2012  killing  of  a  Chinese  coal  mine  manager  may  have  forged  negative  attitudes  in  social  media.    The  use  of  Chinese  capital  to  establish  a  Special  Economic  Zone  in  Lusaka  can  be  seen  through  economic   rather   than   say,   cultural   lenses.   However,   as   Kim   (2013)   demonstrates,   this   can   be  interpreted   from   a   soft   power   –   largely   a   communicative   consideration   –   point   of   view   and  within  that,  as  either  salutary  or  negative.   In  their  study  of  Chinese  soft  power   in  Zambia  (and  Angola),   Jura  and  Kaluzynka   (2013:48)   concluded   that  not  only  were  Zambian  perceptions  on  China  were  positive,  but  also  that  ‘economy,  business  and  development  occupy  a  central  position  in   the   media’.   They   further   observed   that   discussions   on   economic   matters   tended   to   be  ‘concrete’   (mines,   investments   and   energy   for   instance)   rather   than   ‘abstract’   (economic  terminologies   such   as   GDP   and   inflation   for   instance).   As   Sautman   and   Yan   (2009:734)   have  argued,  the  Zambia-­‐China  schisms  are  obviously  a  negative  perception  builder  but  perhaps  not  to   the   extent   of   blighting   a   positive   view   as   received   wisdom   would   have   us   believe   and   as  evident  in  the  fact  that  Sata  lost  both  the  2006  and  2008  elections  in  which  his  pitch  was  an  anti-­‐Chinese   fervour.  We  may   argue   that   other   factors   rather   than   the   China   question  might   have  spurred  Sata’s  2011  election  victory  contrary  to  claims  that  his  win  was  a  no  confidence  vote  in  China.  At  any  rate,  some  analysts  point  out  that  Banda’s  tenure  in  office  was  marred  by  factors  such  as  the  global  recession  that  lessened  global  copper  demands  in  turn  touching  off  a  spate  of  redundancies  that  made  him  unpopular  (Spilsbury,  2012:262).      Jura  and  Kaluzynska  (2013:65)  also  concluded  that  issues  revolving  around  Chinese  labour  and  human   rights   practices  were   highly   localised   or   domesticated   rather   than   bundled  with   other  global  developments  on  this  score  such  as  the  Tibet  question,  the  sagas  of  Chinese  dissidence,  or  any  number  of  human  rights   issues.   It  would  indeed  appear  –  as  we  saw  in  the  analysis  on  the  Chinese   question   in   Zambian   politics   above   –   that   this   localisation   percolates   deeper   into  Zambian  geography  with  some  areas  more  favourable  of  China  than  others.  Flipping  the  analysis  to  the  Chinese  dimension,  Shubo  Li  and  Ronning  (2013:115)  reveal  that  an  article  in  the  Chinese  newspaper,  the  Southern  Weekend  of  8  April  2010,  concluded  thus:  ‘[f]or  ordinary  Zambians,  the  image   of   China   is   far   from   perfect.   Local   people   told   us   frankly   that   in   their   mind,   China   is  associated  with  cheap,  low-­‐quality  products  and  low  wages’.    Framing  China  in  Zambia      From  a  cautious  viewpoint,  analyses  of  China  in  Africa  along  optimistic  and  pessimistic  lines,  is,  in  a  general  sense,  also  true  for  Zambia-­‐China  relations.  In  the  multifarious  Sino-­‐Africa  literature  (Wasserman,   2011;   Alden,   2007;   Shinn   and   Eisenman,   2012),   there   are   typologies   and  metaphors   that   attempt   to   nail   down   the   phenomenon,   in   a  word,   to   ‘frame’   the   China   Africa  relations.  Wasserman  (2011),   in  a  study  of  China  in  South  Africa,  points  out  that  discourses  on  China’s  role  in  Africa  falls  into  a  stark  binary  (read,  framing)  as  either  an  exploitative,  predatory  force  or  a  benevolent  development  partner.      The  above  insights  dovetail  with  Alden’s  (2007)  assessment  of  China  in  Africa  along  three  poles:  Is  China  a  development  partner,   an   economic   competitor,   or   a   colonizer?   Shinn  and  Eisenman  
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(2012)  depict  the  relations  as  either  optimistic  or  pessimistic.  These  metaphors  that  have  been  used   to   describe   China   in   Africa   can   be   theorised   as   frames   of   reference.   We   propose   to  undertake  a  qualitative  analyse  China  in  a  representative  sample  of  Zambian  media,  specifically,  the  Zambia  Daily  Mail,  The  Post  Online,  and  Zambia  Watchdog,   for  the  entire  period  of  January  2013   to   January   2014   using   deductive   sociological   (rather   than   psycho-­‐cognitive)   framing  theoretical   concepts.   We   take   a   qualitative   rather   than   quantitative   turn   because   a   proper  measurement  of  media-­‐driven  perception  of  China  in  Zambia  would  require  access  to  all  media  forms,   including   broadcast   media,   for   it   to   meet   validity   thresholds.   In   addition,   a   proper  understanding   of   the   Zambian   media   system   would   be   required   if   a   quantitative   study   is   to  reveal  meaningful  results.  Yet  an  incisive  understanding  of  the  Zambian  media  scene  would  have  distracted  from  the  core  objective  of  the  study:  what  are  the  media-­‐charted  perceptions  of  China  in   Zambia.   Nonetheless,   this   study   could   provide   entry   points   for   measurement   of   media  perceptions  of  China  in  Zambia.      We   also   use   a   generic,   relaxed   rather   than   a   specific,   strict,   or   reductionist-­‐framing   approach  drawing  on  framing  scholars’  counsel  that  overarching  issues  –  such  as  one  country  in  another  –  are  better  analysed  this  way  (Wekesa,  2013:18).  Of  the  distinctions  made  on  China  in  Africa,  we  propose   to   leverage   Shinn   and   Eisenman’s   (2012:10-­‐14)   optimism   versus   pessimism   framing  bolstered  by  Alden’s  (2007)  partner,  role  model  on  the  one  hand  and  competitor,  exploiter   for  on  the  other  hand.  Thus  the  two  frame  categories  are:  1)  optimistic,  partner,  role  model  and  2)  pessimist,  competitor,  exploiter.      Space   constraints   limit   us   from   giving   a   full   account   of   how   news   media   frame   issues   as   a  consequence   of   which   they   come   to   shape   opinions   and   perceptions.   Suffice   to   mention   that  framing   was   seminally   defined   by   Entman   (1993:52)   as   ‘the   selection   of   some   aspects   of   a  perceived  reality  (making  it)  more  salient  in  a  communicating  text,  in  such  a  way  as  to  promote  a  particular   problem   definition,   causal   relationship,   moral   evaluation,   and/or   treatment’.   Four  decades  of  framing  as  a  significant  theory  in  the  communication  field  indicate  that  frames  have  the   following   qualities:   persistency/frequency/consistency,   selection/placement,   unique  contextualisation,  inclusion/exclusion/insertion,  emphasis/elaboration  (Wekesa,  2013:17).      In   a   nutshell,   the   optimist   perspective   is   motivated   by   the   perception   that   China   needs   what  Zambia  is  naturally  endowed  with,  while  Zambia  needs  investment  capital  to  exploit  her  natural  resources   especially   with   respect   to   copper   (Spilsbury   2012:254).   Optimism,   therefore,  subsumes   considerations   such   as   China   as   partner,   role   model,   benevolent   force,   etc.   The  pessimist  frame  reclines  on  the  understanding  that  Zambia  might  not  be  extracting  a  fair  share  from  its  natural  resources  or  that  the  relations  are  slanted  in  favour  of  China,  to  the  detriment  of  Zambia.   It  would   include   considerations   such   as  Chinese  malevolence,   exploitation,   China   as   a  predator  and  China  as  a  competitor.      In   their   study   of   agencies   of   Chinese   soft   power   in   Angola   and   Zambia,   Jura   and  Kalusynzyka  (2013:   44)   rely   on   articles   derived   from   online   editions   of   newspapers   and   internet   portals.  Among  other  factors  they  advanced  for  this  choice  was  ease  of  access  to  archives.  We  similarly  find   this   approach  worthwhile   for   the   current   study.  We  applied   the   framing/content   analysis  approach   to   Zambia   Daily   Mail,   The   Post   Online,   and   the   Zambia   Watchdog4.   We   selected  headlines   with   the   ‘China’   keyword/code   in   them   published   between   1   January   2013   and   23  January  2014  to  capture  the  ebb  and  flow  for  a  whole  year’s  period.  We  collected  a   total  of  91  articles.   Using   frame   analysis,   we   deduced   the   inclination   of   articles   towards   a   pessimistic,  competitor,  exploiter  frame  or  optimistic,  partner,  role-­‐model  frame  on  the  basis  of  the  nature  of  the  Zambia  engagement  and  the  tonality  of  the  words  and  phrases  used.  With  frame  analysis  as                                                                                                                               4  All  content  was  collected  from  the  online  editions  of  these  news  media.  
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the   theoretical   approach   of   choice,   we   did   not   undertake   discourse   analysis   given   that   our  objective   was   to   categorise   the   content   and   demonstrate   how   selected   words,   phrases,  sentences,  language  use,  and  episodes  contribute  to  the  overall  optimistic  or  pessimistic  themes.  Indeed,   framing   analysis   scholarship   identifies   five   signifying   devices   that   can   be   used   in   the  study   of   media   content   namely;   ‘metaphors,   exemplars,   catchphrases,   depictions,   and   visual  images’  (Gamson  and  Modgiliani  1987).  We  liberally  used  these  devices  save  for  visual  images,  which  would   have   required   a   different   analytical   framework.   A   quick   note   here   is   that   future  research  might  find  it  useful  to  triangulate  frame  analysis  and  discourse  analysis  or  indeed  use  discourse  analysis  on  its  own.  For  the  current  paper  –  focused  on  determining  whether  Zambian  media  frame  China  in  optimistic  or  pessimistic  terms  –  we  deemed  it  sufficient  to  mine  evidence  from   the   content   that   supports   the   polarity   of   the   two   positions   while   only   transiently  commenting  in  what  may  be  referred  to  as  interplay  between  optimistic  and  pessimistic  frames.      After   collecting   the  articles,  we   read  each  one  of   them,  keeping  an  eye  on   language,   instances,  and  topics  that  would  support  either  an  optimistic  or  pessimistic  view.  We  created  a  matrix5  and  using   researcher-­‐discretion,   placed   the   most   telling   instances   that   speak   to   optimism,   role  model,  partnership,  pessimism,  competition,  and  exploitation  in  their  relevant  columns.  Again,  in  the  interests  of  space,  we  decided  not  capture  all  the  headlines  but  to  cite  the  publication  dates  with  the  understanding  that  readers  interested  in  particular  headlines  can  obtain  them  from  the  online  archives  of  the  papers.  We  capture  publication  dates  as   ‘month’  and  ‘date’  and  leave  out  ‘year’  except  for  the  month  of  January  which  traverses  2013  and  2014  in  the  understanding  that  the   rest   are   all   for   the   year   2013.   For   a   good   number   of   articles,   the   optimism   or   pessimism  starts  at  the  headline  level;  however,  we  still  went  into  the  body  of  the  articles  to  mine  evidence  on  either  side.  We  kept  fidelity  to  the  fact  that  some  articles  had  both  optimistic  and  pessimistic  framing  and  duly  captured  this  in  the  placement  of  evidence  of  pessimism  and  optimism  in  the  relevant  columns  of  the  matrix.      After  presenting  the  main  findings,  we  proceed  to  analyse  the  contribution  of  these  news  media  to  the  framing  of  perceptions  about  China.  We  conclude  the  study  with  a  discussion  on  some  of  the  questions  posed  in  the  introduction  of  this  article.    Data  Analysis  and  Findings       Zambia  Daily  Mail    This  newspaper  has  the  highest  amount  of  coverage  on  China  in  Africa  at  38  articles  for  the  study  period.   A   government-­‐owned   newspaper,   it   overwhelmingly   frames   China   in   Zambia   from   an  optimistic  dimension.   Such   is   the  positive   framing  of  China  by   this  newspaper   that   incredulity  would   be   entertained   as   to  why   there   is   no   negative   view   in   line  with   normative   journalistic  values,  especially  balance.  Nonetheless,  the  mere  fact  of  optimistic  framing  by  Zambia  Daily  Mail  (hereafter   referred   to   as   Daily   Mail)   is   indicative   of   the   close   ties   between   the   Sata  administration  and  the  Chinese  partners  in  government  and  business.  Indeed  the  editorial  bent  of  Daily  Mail   towards   an   optimistic   framing   of   China   is   decipherable   in   a   commentary   article:  ‘Chinese   in  Schools   to  Narrow  Gulf  between  Zambia  and  China’   (17  April),  by   the  newspaper’s  editor,   Charles   Chisala,   hailing   the   commencement   of   Hanban   classes   in   schools   as   means   of  enhancing  the  partnership.                                                                                                                                       5  Space  limitations  do  not  allow  for  the  appending  of  the  matrix  but  it  can  be  availed  on  request.  
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Optimist,  Partner,  Role  Model  Frame      Chinese   firms’   involvement   in   infrastructure   development   in   Zambia   is   generally   a   celebrated  trope  (for  instance,  14  June;  28  July;  27  December).  An  insight  gleaned  from  the  reporting  is  that  Chinese  firms  cultivate  close  relations  with  Zambian  officials  as  seen  for  instance  in  the  courtesy  call   by   a   manager   of   China   Henan   International   Industry   Group,   Chen   Zhiqiang,   on   Luapala  Province  Minister,  Brigadier  General  Benson  Kapaya.  In  a  series  of  articles  (14  June;  28  August;  24   September;   27),  we   learn   that   the   cultivation   of   close   ties  with   Zambian   officials   by   China  Henan   might   be   quid   pro   quo   as   the   company   has   won   contracts   for   the   construction   of   an  airport,   a   car   park,   and   a  major   road,   as   well   as   offering   to   design   a   new   town   and   create   a  preferential   economic   trading   zone   all   in   the   Luapala   Province.   Indeed,   seeking   mutual  partnership  can  be  seen  in  a  Zambian  official  ostensibly  ‘appealing’  to  China-­‐Henan  company  to  help  build  a  university  in  rural  Zambia  (27  December).  China-­‐Henan  emerges  as  a  major  player  in   Zambia’s   Luapala   Province,   its   influence   spawning   the   creation   of   a   formal   twinning  programme   between   Luapala   and   the   Chinese   province   of   Henan   with   an   eye   on   increased  investments  from  the  latter  to  the  former  (24  September).    To  the  extent  that  the  Daily  Mail  covers  China  in  positive  light,  it  can  be  said  to  be  a  platform  for  Chinese  media-­‐based-­‐public-­‐diplomacy   towards   Zambia   and   vice   versa.   Further   still,   one   sees  explicit   efforts   to   tap   media   for   a   Zambia-­‐China   political   partnership   project.   We   learn   for  instance  that  the  ruling  Patriotic  Front  (PF)  party  youth  visited  China  to  hone  skills  such  as  ‘how  to  clearly  articulate  party  policies  to  the  public  through  the  media’,  at  the  invitation  of  (China’s)  State  Administration  for  Radio,  Film  and  Television  (SARFT)  (26  June;  10  July).  Quite  interesting  in   terms  of  how  PF  and  CPC  have  buried  the  hatchet  and  embraced   is   the  candid  words  of   the  Chinese  ambassador:  ‘the  Patriotic  Front  has  been  in  touch  with  China  more  than  the  MMD  (the  former  ruling  party)  was’  (10  July).  At  the  time  of  the  PF  youth  media  strategy  training  in  China,  the  Zambian  leaders  who  had  been  hosted  by  the  CPC  included  former  vice  president  Guy  Scott,  PF  national  chairperson  Inonge  Wina,  and  secretary  general  Wynter  Kabimba;  the  latter  being  of  strategic   significance   by   dint   of   his   being   president   of   the   Council   of   African   Political   Parties  (CAPP)  (May  29).    A  good  number  of   articles   can  be   seen  as  China  unleashing  her   soft  power   through  donations,  assistances,   and   cultural   linkages.   These   include:   China   donates   25  motor   vehicles   to   Zambia  Police  (October  23);  China  boosts  police  operations  (June  23);  China  pledges  to  paint  Chingwele  Clinic  (August  10);  China  gives  Zambia  480  solar  panels  for  rural  areas  (April  17);  China,  Brazil  and  India  up  aid  to  Zambia  (March  17);  China  keen  to  train  stadium  managers  (June  27,  as  part  of  the  soft  power  package  attendant  to  the  Lusaka  stadium  built  through  a  grant)  and  China  gives  Zambia  480  solar  panels  for  rural  areas  (April  17).    As   a   strategic   illustration,   a   donation   of   vehicles   to   Zambian   police   –   overseen   by   China’s  ambassador  to  Zambia  Zhou  Yuxio  –  is  on  the  occasion  of  Zambia’s  49th  Independence  Day.  Zhou  used   the  occasion   to   reinforce   the  Zambia-­‐China   ‘all  weather’   partnership   via   reference   to   the  two   nations’   historical   solidarity  while   the   Zambian  Home   Affairs  Minister,   Lungu’s,   response  was  reciprocal.  Another  article  to  demonstrate  the  ambassador’s  media-­‐based  public  diplomacy  mission  is  the  optimism  he  expressed  in  the  robustness  of  the  Zambian  economy  in  2014  in  an  exclusive  interview  (September  26).      Indeed,  trawling  through  the  content,  it  is  evident  that  a  major  remit  for  the  Chinese  ambassador  is   to   shape  positive  perceptions   and   in   the   case   of   Zambia,   this   is   against   the  backdrop  of   the  diplomatic   fall   out   of   earlier   years.   Various   framing   scholars   point   out   that   inclusion   and  exclusion/presence  and  absence  are  some  of  the  strategies  used  to  create  frames  in  audiences.  It  is  evident   that  Chinese  officials   (and  some  extent   their  Zambian  counterparts)  are   long  on   the  earlier   history   of   the   close   ties   –  with   the   role   played   by   founding   president  Kenneth  Kaunda  
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particularly  primed  –  while  Sata’s  anti-­‐Chinese  vituperation  between  2006  and  2011  appears  to  be  a  no  go  zone.   In  the  same  breadth,  while  official  narratives  are  silent  on  economic  disputes,  the  longevity  of  the  Tazara  project  is  nearly  a  standard  mention  in  speeches  as  reported.      Space  does  not  allow  accounting  for  all  direct  Chinese  investment  articles,  thus  we  shall  illustrate  the  articles  that  frame  the  relations  as  partnership  with  just  two  exemplars.  An  August  15  2013  article  highlights  the  Zambian  Development  Agency’s  interests  in  seeking  opportunity  for  small  businesses   in  China  via   the   globally   acclaimed,   annual   China   International   Fair   for   Investment  and  Trade  (CIFIT),  also  known  as  the  Canton  Fair.  Quite  proximate  is  the  reporting  on  a  business  match-­‐making   initiative   by   China  Ministry   of   Commerce   that  would   see   Zambian   and   Chinese  companies   collaborating   in   seeking   international   markets   (including   the   African   products  exhibition  centre  in  Yiwu,  China)  for  Zambian  produced  goods  (August  12).   Investments  in  the  tourism   sector   can   be   seen   in   the   headline:   China   intends   to   promote   Sino-­‐Africa   tourism  (August  28).    In  some  respects,  Chinese  economic  links  with  Africa  are  construed  more  favourably  than  those  from  the  West.  An  article  commenting  on  US  President  Barak  Obama’s  visit   to  Africa  paints  an  optimistic  picture  of  China.  It  lambasts  US’  preoccupation  with  what  has  been  termed  ‘Western  Consensus’   ideals   (July  12).  An  article   critical  of   the  West  and  supportive   for  China   is   tellingly  entitled:   ‘Friendly   dragon:   China’s   investments   in   Zambia’   (June   11).   An   analysis   of   all   the  opinion   articles   in   Daily   Mail   in   which   China   and   the   West   are   compared   holds   up   China-­‐optimism  against  decided  West-­‐pessimism.    An  interesting  point  to  note  with  regards  to  opinion  articles  is  that  while  they  generally  carve  a  positive  perception  for  China,  opinion  articles  by  their  very  nature  must  respond  to  or  argue  the  case  against  certain  topical  issues.  In  so  doing  the  opinion  writer  is  constrained  to  include  or  at  least  touch  on  the  position  he  or  she  is  contesting.  This,  in  news  framing  terms,  ends  up  availing  a  counter  frame  to  the  audience.  Such  is  the  case  with  an  opinion  article  by  Qu  Xing,  president  of  the  China   Institute   of   International   Studies   (Qu   Xing,   2013)   in   which   he   counters   the   widely  discussed   article   by   Nigerian   Central   Bank   governor   Lamido   Sanusi   and   published   in   the  influential  Financial  Times.  Sanusi  (2013)  pointedly  wrote  that  Africa  ‘must  see  China  for  what  it  is:  a  competitor’  and   ‘fight  predatory  policies’.  The  sting   in  the  negative   framing  occasioned  by  Sanusi’s  treatise  is  not  just  that  he  is  the  chief  executive  of  Nigeria’s  reserve  bank  of  but  also  the  fact  that  his  father  was  Nigeria’s  ambassador  to  Beijing.  A  quick  observation  here  as  well  is  that  most   opinion   articles   in   Zambian   papers   are   likely   to   analyse   China   not   just   from   a   Zambian  pigeonhole  but  from  a  wider  Pan  African  standpoint.      Based   on   the   definitive   consideration   of   news   frames   as   charted   by   the   consistency   and  frequency  of   topics  and  rhetoric,   the  single  most   important  event   in  positive   framing  of  China-­‐Zambia  relations  and  therefore  the  height  of  the  China  optimism  is  the  ten  back-­‐to-­‐back  articles  reporting   or   based   on   former   president   Sata’s   maiden,   week-­‐long   visit   to   China   published  between  April  3  and  April  19).    The  optimism,  partnership  and  role  model  aspects  of  the  trip  are  seen  in  the  following  sample  of  evidence:  The  singing  of  several  multimillion  agreements  with  potential   for  Zambia’s  economic  development   (for   instance   discussions   for   establishment   of   a   Zambian   national   airline);   the  special   treatment  accorded  Sata  (in  a  manner   to  suggest  he  was  treated  ostensibly  better   than  other  past  African  visiting  heads  of  state);  the  fact  that  he  was  the  first  African  head  of  state  to  meet   then  newly  elevated  Chinese   leaders,  President  Xi   Jinping  and  Premier  Li  Keqiang;  Sata’s  pledge  to  recognize  the  one-­‐China  policy  and  CNMC’s  sponsorship  of  the  Zambia-­‐China  Economic  and  Investment  Forum.        
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Pessimist,  Competitor,  Exploiter  Frame      The   few   articles   in   the  Daily  Mail   in  which   salience   is   placed   on   the   pessimist   frame   seem   to  revolve   less  on   ideological  matters  and  more  on   the  competence  of  Chinese   firms  or   failure   to  extract  maximum  value  out  of  natural  resources  (August  28;  April  26).      As  we   saw  earlier,   China-­‐Henan  officials   have   forged   close   ties  with  officials   from   the  Luapala  Province.   Interestingly   however,   the   same   company   may   be   seen   in   reverse   as   authoring   a  pessimistic  view  of  China  in  Zambia.  The  headline:  ‘China-­‐Henan  risks  being  blacklisted’  (August  28)   is   particularly   instructive.   It   transpires   that   the   China   Henan   officials’   visits   to   Luapala  government  officials  in  December  2013  and  the  twinning  program  of  this  Zambian  province  with  China’s   Henan   Province   in   September   2013   followed   a   threat   to   rescind   a   road   construction  contract  awarded  to  the  company  apparently  in  another  region  of  Zambia  (Kafue-­‐Lusaka  road)  in   August   2013.   Even   without   the   benefit   of   finer   nuance,   it   is   evident   that   China   Henan’s  contribution   to   positive   framing   in   one   region   of   Zambia  may   be   offset   by   charges   of   shoddy  work  and  delays  in  other  parts  of  the  country  (it  appears  the  company  had  attracted  the  ire  of  Zambian   officials   on   at   least   two   other   infrastructure   projects).   Caution   would   however   be  exercised  before   judging   the   company  harshly   in   that   one  project   for  which  China  Henan  was  criticised  was   funded  by   the  World  Bank   in  addition   to   the  plausible   reasons  advanced  by   the  company   for   the   delays.   But   this   does   little   to   remove   the   sting   in   the   words   of   a   Zambian  minister:  ‘when  I  heard  that  China  Henan  has  been  awarded  this  contract  I  was  very  worried’.    In  what  amounts  to  an  exception  to  the  rule,  the  lone  article  critiquing  the  failure  of  Zambians  to  extract   maximum   value   from   their   natural   resources   is   by   Anthony   Mukwita,   then   managing  director  of  Daily  Mail   (March  31).   In  a  visit   to  a   company   in  southern  China,  Mukwita   realizes  that   its   globally   competitive   products   are   made   from   copper   mined   in   Zambia.   This   insight  motivates   him   to   pen   a   piece   decrying   Zambia’s   failure   to   add   value   to   her   copper  while   the  Chinese   company   in   question   boasts   a   balance   sheet   ‘several   times   higher   than   Zambia   as   a  country’.  This  then  introduces  probably  the  only  potential  China-­‐as-­‐exploiter  plank  in  the  corpus  of  articles  from  Daily  Mail  for  the  study  period.      The  Post  Online    We   collected  25   items   from  The  Post  Online.   It   is  privately  owned  news  media   thus  would  be  expected  to  take  a  much  more   independent  editorial  bent   in  covering  China   in  Zambia;   thus,   it  would  be  expected   that   the  newspaper  would   frame  China   in  both  positive  and  negative  hues.  Evidence   from   data   however   presents   a   contrary   picture   in   that   most   stories   are   positive  (optimistic)   rather   than   negative   (pessimistic).   The   reasons   of   this   would   require   further  investigation   to  appreciate   this  rather  startling   finding.  A  quick   finding   is   that  The  Post  Online  seems   to   have   changed   from   bashing   Sata   before   he   became   president   (as   we   saw   in   the  literature  review)  to  being  positive  about  links  with  China  during  his  presidency.      Because   The   Post   Online   resembles   and   reflects   Daily   Mail   in   more   respects   than   one,   we  decided  to  discuss  only  framing  considerations  peculiar  to  it  (The  Post  Online),  leaving  out  those  that  bear  a  ‘cut  and  copy’  outlook  with  Daily  Mail.    Optimist,  Partner,  Role  Model  Frame      Erroneous  or  otherwise,  the  perspective  that  the  Chinese  state  encourages  state-­‐owned  firms  to  compete  with  their  private  counterparts   in  the  Zambian  market  rather  than  lobbying  for  them,  charts  an  optimistic  frame  (November  26).  The  gist  of  this  article  is  that  Zambians  should  learn  from   factors   that  have  made  China  an  economic  powerhouse  key  among   them   the  culture  and  ethics   of   diligence,   tenacity   and   hard   work   as   opposed   to   Zambian   workers’   lethargy   and  
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indolence.  Other  articles  with  a  similar  ‘China  as  a  role  model  framing’  were  published  between  January  and  April  2013.      If  events  play  an  important  role  in  optimistic  framing  of  China,  then  the  Chinese  Spring  Festival  presents   a   particularly   opportune  moment.   During   the   January   2014   edition,   no   less   than   the  Zambian   first   lady,   Christine   Kasemba,   graced   the   celebrations   to   extol   the   strides   made   in  China-­‐Zambia  relations  in  2013  with  expectations  that  2014  held  even  better  prospects  (January  26  2014).  We  see  a  cultural  turn  to  public  diplomacy  perspective  when  the  Chinese  ambassador  to  Zambia  inaugurates  the  2014  spring  festival  (January  24  2014).      A  November  1  article  highlights  three  optimistic  framing  perspectives:  the  Chinese  ambassador  doing  public  diplomacy  in  the  sense  of  damage  control,  China  as  a  responsible  force  for  good  in  Zambia  and  Chinese   firms  as  helping  Zambia  overcome   infrastructure   challenges.  The   training  aspect  embedded   in  a  contract  awarded  to  China  Civil  Engineering  Construction  Corporation  –  the   company   that   is   the   subject   of   the   story   –   furthers   the   optimism.   Along   the   same   lines   is  China  Gansu  (company’s)  building  of  the  first  government  secondary  school  in  a  rural  Zambian  region  (April  24).      There   is   a   surfeit   of   other   items   constructing   the   optimistic   frame   and   which   we   saw   in   the  analysis  of  the  Daily  Mail  above.  These  include  investments  and  development  partnership  such  as  the  potential  for  Zambia  to  emulate  China  in  rice  production  or  the  commendation  of  Chinese  investments   reported   April   12   and   April   28;   political   solidarity/partnership   such   as   the  headlines,   ‘PF   inspiring,   protecting   citizens   -­‐   Communist   Party   of   China’   (June   25)   and  ‘Communist   Party   of   China   urges   caution   on   West   forces’   (July   1);   assistance   such   as   ‘China  pledges   continued   support   to   Levy   hospital’   (September   19)   and   ‘Chinese   care   for   Zambia's  development  –  Ling’   (April  19);  cultural  partnerships  such  as   ‘Chamanga,  Katongo  on  target   in  China’   (April   16)   and   ‘Chinese   club   prunes   Chansa’   (March   30);   infrastructure   development  partnership   such   as   ‘TAZARA   acquires   new   locomotives   from   China’   (December   31),   ‘China  Jiangxi  spends  $2.5m  on  Green  equipment’  (June  13)  and  ‘China  Jiangxi  imports  road  equipment  worth  $25m’  (April  4)  and  geopolitics  such  as  ‘China,  old  friend  or  new  colonialists?’(July  18).  Pessimist,  competitor,  exploiter  frame    In  some  cases,  a  negative  sentiment  about  China  emanate  from  straightforward  legal  disputes  as  in   the   case   of   a   contempt   of   court   proceedings   against   China   Jiangsu   instituted   by   a   Lusaka  businessman   (August   1).   Rational   audience   would   give   the   benefit   of   doubt   to   either   party.  However,  the  possibility  for  Zambian  readers  to  see  the  legal  clash  from  a  nationalistic,  patriotic  viewpoint  might  mean  a  negative  view  on  the  Chinese  company.    To   the   extent   that   small-­‐scale   Chinese   traders   entering   local   markets   to   sell   goods   are  considered   an   illegality,   this   forges   a   pessimistic   framing   of   China.   Indeed   no   less   than   the  Zambian   trade   and   then   industry   deputy   minister,   Miles   Sampa,   is   reported   warning   dire  consequences   for   Chinese   nationals   found   ‘trading   chickens   and   vegetables’   (August   26).   A  closer  look  reveals  that  the  minister’s  ire  might  have  been  tied  to  his  political  interests  in  that  he  represented  a  constituency  in  which  the  market  in  question  is  located.  A  trader  is  quoted  posing  the   question   as   to   whether   a   foreigner   would   be   allowed   to   ‘sell   things   like   sweets   (candy),  vegetables  or  chickens  in  China?’    Another  China-­‐as-­‐exploiter  frame  is  presented  in  the  implied  flouting  of  a  stipulation  requiring  foreign   contractors   to   give   20%   of   their   work   to   Zambian   firms   (August   27).   Indeed   the   PF  government’s  enactment  of  this  policy  –  known  as  8,000  Link  Zambia  Project  –  may  have  been  spurred   in   the   first  place  by   the  clamour  by   local   contractors   to  be  protected   from   their  more  competent  counterparts   in  a  manner  to  suggest   the  negative  side  of   infrastructure  contracting.  The   8,000   Link   Project   is   Zambia’s   plan   to   construct   8,000   kilometres   of   roads   and   was  
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developed  with  legal  backing  for  the  implementation  agency  –  The  Roads  Development  Agency  –  to   ensure   that   Zambia   engineers   and   other   technical   professionals   and   companies   get   a  mandatory   20%   sub   contract.   The   plan   is   to   ensure   that   Zambians   gain   monetarily   from   the  infrastructure  project  as  well  as  enhancing  their  skills  and  in  terms  of  technology  transfer.  In  the  article,  the  Chinese  companies  specifically  accused  of  resisting  this  requirement  were  mentioned  as  AVIC  International  Project  Engineering  Company  and  Sinohydro  Company  Ltd  (August  27).      A  fairly  innocuous  negative  framing  is  with  respect  to  speculation  that  the  Zambian  government  intended   to   import   maize   from   China,   dismissed   by   the   government   spokesman   as   a   mere  rumour  (December  13).  This  would   fall   in   the  pessimistic  column  on  the  back  of  allegations  of  corruption   and   collusion   –   real   or   perceived   –   between   Zambian   officials   and   Chinese   firms  whenever  a  tender  for  procurement  of  goods  and  services  is  on  the  cards.      In  ‘expressing  shock  at  allegations  that  Chinese-­‐run  mines  produce  more  of  Zambian  copper  but  contribute   little   to   the   country's   economic   growth   because   profits   are   being   taken   to   develop  China’,   the  Chinese  ambassador  Zhou  may  have  been  on  a  mission   to   furnish  a   counter   frame.  However  the  possibility  that  this  would  only  serve  as  confirmation  of  this  potentially  deleterious  allegation  cannot  be  discounted  out  of  hand  thus  contributing  to  an  exploiter  view  (September  9).    Zambia  Watchdog      We  collected  28  items  from  Zambia  Watchdog.   It   is  an  independent  online  platform  that  places  itself  in  opposition  to  the  government.  It  collaborates  with  yet  another  online  platform  –  Zambia  Reports   –   and   between   them   constitutes   critical,   gate-­‐keeper-­‐against-­‐government   voices.  Because  of  its  stance,  Zambia  Watchdog  attracted  a  backlash  from  the  Sata  administration  and  as  of  the  time  of  this  study  was  being  hosted  outside  the  country.  Some  of  the  articles  from  the  site  use  rough-­‐hewn  expletives  that  must  have  tested  the  tolerance  levels  of  both  the  Sata  regime  and  Chinese  authorities’  tolerance  to  the  limit.      Optimist,  Partner,  Role  Model  Frame      The   rare   occasions   when   Zambia  Watchdog   charts   an   upward   looking   sentiment   for   China   is  when  undertaking  straightforward  reporting  on  events.  One  article,  (May  28)  starts  with  subtle  negative  valance:  ‘Zambian  army  commander  fully  supports  the  so-­‐called  ‘one  China  policy’.  We  notice  the  use  of   ‘so-­‐called’  as  frowning  on  ‘one  China  policy’,  which  is  in  quotes  in  the  original  text.  Also,   satirical  mention   is  made  of   ‘General  Mihova  visiting  China  as  part  of  Zambia  newly  gained   love   for   countries   like   China,   Cuba,   Sudan’   (May   28).   However,   the   greater   part   of   the  article   reports   the   positive   aspects   of   long   term   friendly   Zambia-­‐China   cooperation   in   the  military  and  political   fields.  Optimistic   framing,   although   inserted   in   critical   articles,   continues  the  pattern  we  saw  in  the  Daily  Mail  and  The  Post  Online,  of  extolling  China’s  involvement  in  the  infrastructure  development  arena  (roads  railways,   ICT,  energy  and  sports   facilities)  and  Sata’s  invitation  of  Chinese  investors  (May  7).    Equally,  much  as  a   lingering  negative   tone   is  perceivable   in  headlines  relating   to  Sata’s  visit   to  China   as   seen   in   the   sarcasm   in   the   headlines,   these   remain   some   of   the   few   occasions  when  Zambia  Watchdog  represents  China  in  positive  terms  (April  11;  April  6;  April  1;  22  March  22).    While  Zambia  Watchdog  may  be   through-­‐and-­‐through  an  anti-­‐establishment  platform,   the   fact  that  it  allows  a  Chinese  national  to  push  back  on  some  of  the  accusations  made  against  his  nation  reflects  positively  on  it  along  fair-­‐comment-­‐normative-­‐journalistic  principles  (April  18).  Among  the   positive   frame   elements   that   ‘China  man’   propounds   is:   China   as   ‘the   only   country   in   the  world  that  shows…willingness  to  invest  in  Africa’,  China  availing  low  interest  loans  as  well  as  aid,  
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the  affordability  of  Chinese  goods,  and  the  disinterest  or  incapacity  of  countries  such  as  ‘USA,  UK  and  India’  to  help  Africa  in  similar  ways.      Pessimist,  Competitor,  Exploiter  Frame    Analysing   Zambia   Watchdog   articles,   it   is   evident   that   this   web-­‐based   media   is   both   a   news  provider  covering  other  sources  as  well  as  engaged  in  defence  of   its  own  role  as  a  vanguard  of  Zambia’s   democracy.   Taking   an   advocacy   approach,   the   news   site   accuses   China   of   supplying  equipment  to  the  Zambian  government  for  internet  surveillance  and  blockage  of  critical  content  flow  (September  6;  February  21).  The  articles  indicate  that  the  Zambia  Watchdog  and  a  kindred  online  site,  Zambia  Reports,  are  some  of  the  targets  of  the  alleged  surveillance.  The  implication  here  is  that  China  is  aiding  information  and  press  repression  and  rolling  back  media  freedoms  in  Zambia.      Citing  anonymous  sources  the  article  makes  sweeping  assertions:  ZTE  is  involved  in  corruption  over   a   security   camera   surveillance   contract   in   Lusaka   and  Huawei   is   ‘a   Chinese  military   and  secret  service  wing  of  the  Chinese  government  that  was  barred  ‘from  operating  in  America  and  other  major  Western  Nations’.  Apparent  responses   to   these  allegations  on   the  Huawei  website  are   treated  with  utter   incredulity.  Ultimately   ZTE  and  Huawei   are  used   to   frame  a   thoroughly  pessimistic  image  of  China  bordering  on  antagonism  (September  6;  February  21).    A  related  article  sees  the  launch  of  a  newspaper  to  serve  the  Chinese  community  in  Zambia  -­‐  The  Oriental  Post   –  as   ‘borrowing  repressive  media   trends   from  the   far  East’   (July  19).  Within   this  pessimistic  frame,  criticism  is  levelled  at  ‘President  Michael  Sata’s  dictatorial  regime  (which)  has  praised  China’s  media  record  despite  that  country’s  repressive  media  laws’  (February  21).  This  activist/advocacy   journalism   is   appreciable   when   one   reads   further   in   the   article   that   ‘the  popular  Zambian  Watchdog  is  inaccessible  in  Zambia,  ostensibly  blocked  by  the  regime.  Thus,  we  are  invited  to  see  the  Zambia  Watchdog  as  a  defender  of  free  press  and  related  democratic  ideals  as  well  as,  ostensibly,  a  victim  of  ‘bad  press  laws’.  The  message  here  is  that  China  is  not  good  for  Zambia’s   press   freedom.   It   is   probably   in   the   interest   of   protecting   the   identity   of   the  ‘investigative  journalists’  writing  these  stories  for  Zambia  Watchdog  that  nearly  all  articles  have  no  by-­‐lines,  supposedly  to  protect  them  from  reprisals.      The   Zambia   Watchdog   positions   itself   as   an   anti-­‐corruption   crusader.   One   article   written  without  a  by-­‐line  purports   to   ‘expose’  a   top  Zambian  army  officer  destined   for  China  allegedly  found  with  ‘elephant  tusks  in  two  of  the  suitcases’  at  the  Kenneth  Kaunda  International  Airport  (June  5).  The  dramatic  article  suggests  collusion  between  Zambian  and  Chinese  military  officers  under   the  cover  of  diplomatic   immunity   in   the   illegal   trafficking  of  wildlife   trophy  and   further  implies  impunity  in  the  ostensible  allowing  of  the  army  officer  to  proceed  to  China  despite  being  ‘caught  red-­‐handed’.      From  a  geopolitical  viewpoint,  Sata’s  embrace  of  China  and  his  criticism  of  the  West  are  seen  as  a  case  of  double  standards  (June  3).,  and  why  would  Sata  give  potential  Western  investors  a  wide  berth   while   embracing   their   Chinese   counterparts?   Zambia   Watchdog   posits   the   following  pessimistic   hypothesis:   investors   from   the   West   would   not   condone   corruption;   Western  investors  would   demand   respect   for   human   rights   as   pre-­‐condition;   Chinese   investors   ‘invest  where  there  are  loopholes  and  room  for  bribing  government  officials’  (June  3).      Zambia  Watchdog  is  both  an  enterprise  news  media  as  well  as  an  aggregator  of  news  from  other  sources.   In  an  article  sourced  from  Africa-­‐Asia  Confidential  magazine,  one  sees  a  blend  of  both  optimism  and  pessimism.  The  balance  however  swings  towards  a  pessimistic  valance  especially  with   respect   to   instances   of   Chinese   firms’   –   such   as   Sogecoa,   a   subsidiary   of   Anhui   Foreign  
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Economic   Construction   Group   –   allegedly   bribing   former   president   Rupiah   Banda   to   win  lucrative  contracts,  among  a  litany  of  other  cases  (May  7).    While  the  prosecution  of  former  president  Banda  is  presented  as  old  corruption,  the  Sata  regime  is   seen  as  having   fallen   in   the   same   trap   it   sought   to   cure.  The  above  article   (May  7)  quotes  a  Zambian  university   professor   saying:   ‘we   still   see  Chinese  waiters,   bartenders,   even   guards   at  gates  in  Chinese  hotels  and  buildings…  and  these  are  the  jobs  Sata  and  the  PF  promised  to  grab  and   give   to   the   one  million   Zambian   youths  who   voted   for   them   in   2011.,   and  who   is   issuing  work   permits   to   those   Chinese   nationals   to   come   and   do   donkey   jobs   here?   It’s   the   PF  government’.  In  a  nutshell,  this  lengthy  article  implies  a  let  down,  some  kind  of  betrayal  on  the  part  of  Sata  and  ends  up  painting  a  pessimistic  view  of  China.      With  respect  to  Chinese  nationals  competing  with  locals  for  jobs,  a  similar  perspective  is  seen  in  a  heated  exchange  between  a  Zambian  writer   and  a  Chinese   commentator   (April  18  and  April  18)  with  the  latter  article  explaining  that  poor  work  ethics  is  the  reason  why  Chinese  companies  hire   Chinese   nationals   even   though   it   would   have   made   economic   sense   to   hire   Zambian  workers.      Whilst  we  do  not   see   reportage  on   labour  unrest   in  Daily  Mail   and  The  Post  during  2013,   it   is  only  in  Zambia  Watchdog  that  such  an  incident  is  reported  (January  3).  This  not  only  reinforces  the  widely  reported  variants  of  labour  schisms  of  yesteryears  but  also  dovetails  with  allegations  of  failure  to  employ  locals  to  further  cement  a  pessimistic  outlook  on  China.    In  terms  of  China’s  image  in  Zambia,  what  can  we  make  of  a  story  that  claims  Sata  is  involved  in  nepotism  by  sending  his  niece  to  China  as  an  ambassador  (November  25)?  At  the  surface  level,  it  may  appear  that  China  has  little  to  do  with  the  nepotism  charge.  However,  when  read  from  the  perspective  of  Sata  being  keen  to  have  a  reliable  relative  as  envoy   in  Beijing,  an   interpretation  could   be   made   to   infer   the   significance   of   China   in   the   Sata   administration’s   international  relations   architecture.   By   extension,   an   inference   could   then   be  made   that   having   a   niece   for  plenipotentiary  to  the  Great  Hall  of  the  People  court  may  have  ominous  albeit  not  immediately  decipherable   goals.   But   then  we   learn   that   the  niece-­‐ambassador   is   related   to   Sata   by   being   a  relative  of  the  Zambian  first  lady.  On  another  more  direct  pessimism  front,  Sata  is  indeed  quoted  as   saying:   the   ‘Chinese   (are)   cleverer   than   Zambians   so   (the   niece-­‐ambassador)   should   be  careful’  (November  25).    An   equally   abrasive   article   claims   that   President   Sata   is   sinking   Zambia   into   a   debt   trap   by  borrowing  money  used  to  pay  civil  servant  salaries  (August  8).  Sata  is  first  labelled  as  an  ‘ailing  dictator’   and   then   an   implied   complicity   of   China   in   Zambia’s   debt   burden   is  made.  While   the  writer’s   criticism   is   directed   at   Sata   and   not   China,   China   still   suffers   collateral   damage.   Even  more   abrasive   to   frightening   proportions   is   an   article   that   alleges   that   Zambia   has   borrowed  US$19  million  for  the  production  and  supply  of  bombs  and  gunpowder  (April  15).    Given   its   historical   importance,   can   anything   negative   be   said   about   China   in   reference   to  Tazara?  Nay,  so  goes  received  wisdom,  given  the  ardours  sacrifices  in  blood  and  money  that  the  Mao  Zedong/Zhou  Enlai  generation  expended  to  build  the  railway  at  a  time  when  China  herself  was   in   need   of   development   resources.   Zambia   Watchdog   thinks   otherwise.   In   one   article,   a  writer  wonders  how  many   times  Zambians   should   thank  China   for  Tazara   (April  12).   In  other  words,  the  writer  implies  Zambians  have  already  thanked  China  enough  about  Tazara  and  need  not  belabour  it  any  further.  What  reasons  are  advanced  in  attempting  to  convert  this  iconoclastic  exemplar  of  positive  framing  for  China  into  a  pessimistic  one?  Among  others,  the  following  can  be  delineated:  it  is  as  if  Zambians  are  being  reminded  that  they  are  beggars;  the  project  was  built  through  a  loan  being  paid  for  to  date;  a  substantial  amount  of  the  money  went  back  to  China  in  terms   of   paying   for   Chinese   construction   workers;   the   railway   is   strategic   for   transporting  
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copper  to  China…in  sum,  the  article  turns  an  optimistic  framing  of  Tazara  into  a  pessimistic  one.  The  negative  portrayal  coming  out  of  the  positivity  associated  with  Tazara  is  further  bolstered  in  an  article  that  claims  that  Chinese  trains  acquired  by  Tazara  had  been  found  to  be  faulty  (April  12).    Discussion    The  key  finding  of  this  study  is  that  collectively,  the  three  Zambian  media  outlets  –  constituting  a  substantial  section  of  the  Zambian  media  system  –  are  more  optimistic  about  China  than  they  are  pessimistic.   Even   though   this   is   a   limited   study   to   extent   that   it   does   not   cover   the   Zambian  media  lay-­‐of-­‐the-­‐ground  in  its  entirety,  we  can  cautiously  conclude  that  the  selected  media  are  a  reflection   of   the   optimistic   inclination   of   the   Zambian   media   in   general   in   lieu   of   a   more  thoroughgoing   study.   For   the   current   study,   it   is   sufficient   to   conclude   that   the   government-­‐owned  Daily  Mail  crafts  an  optimistic  perception  by  dint  of  Zambia’s  good  relations  with  China,  while,   and   as  we   see   below,  The   Post   Online,   is   virtually   a   government-­‐allied   newspaper   and  therefore  equally  optimistic  on  and  for  China.      While  we  can  affirm  Zambian  media  as  a  source  of  knowledge,  information  and  data  on  Zambia-­‐China   relations,   we   must   exercise   caution   on   the   basis   of   this   article’s   findings.   Using   only   a  government  paper  such  as  Daily  Mail  or  an  oppositional  news  site  such  as  Zambia  Watchdog  may  present   images   of   China   in   Zambia   so   divergent   as   to   give   pause   to   a   reader,   an   analyst   or   a  researcher.   Additionally,   huge   discrepancy   on   balance   and   fairness   from   the   sampled   news  media   suggests   the   audience   research   dimension   cannot   be   ignored   if   the   real   perceptions   of  Zambians  on  the  China  question  are  to  be  appreciated  with  a  measure  of  comprehensiveness.      While  The  Post  Online  is  closest  to  editorial  independence  on  the  China  theme,  evidence  abounds  to  demonstrate  that  this  editorial  independence  is  only  relative  in  the  Zambian  media  ecology,  as  it   swings   decidedly   to   a   pro-­‐China   stance.   China   optimism   is   quite   fine   and   in   some   instances  should   be   applauded.   However,   for   a   sophisticated   reader,   the   ululation   and   gushing   towards  China  in  some  of  the  The  Post  Online  content  may  be  overly  optimistic  as  to  forge  suspicion  on  the  dalliance  between  this  outlet  and  Zambian  and  Chinese  officialdom.  The  same  would  apply  to  Zambia  Watchdog  whose  take-­‐no-­‐prisoner  approach  is,   in  many  a  case,  too  abrasive  as  to  raise  suspicions  about  the  possibility  that  this  site’s  default  is  to  be  a  China-­‐basher.    A   related   observation   is   that,   as  we   saw   in   earlier   sections,  The   Post   Online   (as  well   as  Daily  Mail)  were  critical  of  Sata  during  his  opposition  heydays  but  switched  to  a  pro-­‐Sata  stance  once  he  took  power  (see  Spilsbury  2012:  264  for  instance).  This  may  indeed  be  a  function  of  Zambian  media  allying  themselves  with  the  regime  in  power  for  a  variety  of  political  economy  factors  that  further  research  could  reveal.  One  line  of  inquisition  would  be  whether  supposedly  independent  newspapers  such  as  The  Post  Online  are  so  dependent  on  the  Zambian  government  for  economic  survival   that   they   can’t   dare   ‘bite   the   hand   that   feeds   them’   and   thus   willingly   lose   their  independence.  With  respects  to  China,  it  is  worthwhile  noting  that  indeed  Sata  had  transformed  from  an  anti-­‐China  crusader   to  one  who  cautiously  embraces  China  and  with   the  government-­‐owned  Daily  Mail  and  ‘independent’  The  Post  Online,  following  suit.    In   light   of   the   many   instances   of   open   partisanship   of   Zambian   media   questions   arise   about  fidelity   to   normative   journalistic  models   in   view   of   the   fact   that   Zambia   follows   a  Westphalia  modus  operandi.  For  instance,  while  the  Daily  Mail  and  The  Post  Online  are  long  on  the  historical  links   between   China   and   Zambia,   the   Zambia   Watchdog   glosses   over   this   agency   of   positive  framing  for  China  in  Zambia.  Indeed,  Zambia  Watchdog  goes  so  far  as  to  question  the  benefits  of  the  relations   in  a  manner  analogous  to  Alden’s  (2007)  characterization   ‘China’s  perfect  storm’,  or   Shinn   and   Eisenman’s   (2012)   conclusion   that   certain   aspects   of   the   relations   have   left   ‘a  legacy  of  ill  will’.    
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  While  literature  indicates  that  the  copper  industry  is  the  main  source  of  negativity  about  China,  this  study  finds  that  as  of  2013,  things  may  have  changed.  Indeed,  articles  to  do  with  investments  promotion  and  attraction  hog  much  more  space  than  the  already  established  mining  sector.  Only  one   incident   of   labour   action   related   to   mining   is   reported   while   a   dispute   over   mining  regulations   is   reported   in   the   context   of   the   problem   having   been   solved.   Could   this   be   an  indication   that   the  mining  woes  of  yesteryears  are  on   the  way   to  a   smoother   ride  under  Sata?  Indeed,   the   China   Non-­‐Ferous   Mining   Company,   which   is   critiqued   for   labour   mishaps   and  controversies,   is   the   same   company   that   hosts   Sata   during   his   state   visit   to   China   with  discussions   decidedly   upbeat.   This   trope   indeed   dovetails   with   charges   in   the   Zambian  Watchdog  that  craft  the  character  of  Sata  as  an  opportunistic  turncoat  whose  earlier  criticism  of  China  were  in  the  pursuit  of  political  power  by  all  means.    An   interesting   observation   is   that   Zambia   and   China   have   entered   cooperation   in   the   media  sector   beyond   the   hardware   media   assistance   that   we   synthesised   in   the   literature   review  section  above.  The  ruling  Patriotic  Front  youth  invited  by  China’s  State  Administration  for  Radio  Film   and   Television   (SARFT)   to   learn   how   to   package   and   channel   media   messages   is   a  demonstration  of  this  collaboration.  A  top  manager-­‐editor  of  The  Post  Online  is  invited  to  China  from  where  he  writes  a  positively   framed  opinion  piece.  This   ‘capacity  building’  assistance  can  be  distinguished  from  the  material  support  that  China  offered  Zambia  in  the  past  such  as  China’s  donation  of  radio  transmission  equipment  to  Zambia  in  the  1960s,  1980,  2002,  2005,  2006  and  2011  (Yu-­‐Shan  Wu  2012:13-­‐15;  Shinn  and  Eisenman  (2012:324).  Would  this  capacity  building  dimension  of  Chinese  assistance  to  Zambia  serve  as  confirmation  of  the  suppositions  by  writers  such   as   Farah   and  Mosher   (2010)   and   Banda   (2009)   that   there   is   an   ideological   ‘reshape’   of  African  and  Zambian  media  underway?  An  extension  of  this  media  dimension  of  cooperation  can  be   seen   in   the  wider   context   of   Zambia-­‐Africa-­‐China   cooperation   at   political   party   level   in   the  case  of  the  Zambian  politician,  Wynter  Kabimba  reported  as  securing  the  position  of  president  of  the  Council  of  African  Political  Parties  (CAPP)  coincidentally  headquartered  in  Khartoum,  Sudan  (Daily  Mail  May  29).  Investigation  reveals  that  a  Chinese  Communist  Party  graced  the  occasion  of  the  launch  of  CAPP  with  Western  representatives  missing  at  the  event  (Raziq  and  Hai,  2013).  This  is  an  important  development  to  note  because  literature  indicates  that  Sudan  and  Zambia  are  the  polar  countries  where  Chinese  involvement  in  Africa  has  been  framed  controversially.      As  with  other  forms  of  Zambia-­‐China  links,  Chinese  media  assistance  –  whether  of  the  hardware  or  software  variety   -­‐  has  been   framed   in  a  Manichean  way.  For   instance,  Brautigam  (2011:10)  argues  that  Radio  transmitters  apparently  supplied  by  China  were  ‘delivering  primary  education  to  out  of  school  children’  many  of  them  orphans.  However,  Farah  and  Mosher  (2010:16)  see  the  Chinese  media  support  for  Zambia  in  the  context  of  China  attempting  to  prop  up  regimes  keen  on  rolling  back  press   freedom  and  democracy  and  aiding  despotic   regimes.   In   ‘gotcha   journalism’  fashion,   they   conclude   that   this   support   was   ‘awarded   during   election   years   [and]   timed   to  support   the   pro-­‐Beijing  MMD   in   its   electoral   campaign   effort’,   a   viewpoint   advanced   by   Shinn  and  Eisenman  (2012:73)  who  state  that:  ‘the  Chinese  side  also  gave  the  MMD  FM  transmitters  to  help  get  out  the  vote  in  rural  areas’.  From  Franks  and  Ribet  (2009:  131)  we  get  the  perspective  that   Chinese   media   support   was   meant   to   ‘potentially   diffuse   the   electoral   power   that   the  opposition   parties   might   have   had’.   The   instances   of   media   cooperation   that   we   see   in   the  content   analysis   of   this   article,   however,   demonstrates   that   Chinese   media   assistance   is   not  necessarily  timed  to  coincide  with  electioneering  periods  but  one  that  is  temporally  continuous  as  equally  argued  by  Brautigam  (2011:9-­‐10).      China-­‐Africa  literature  indicates  that  Chinese  media  are  in  Africa  on  a  public  diplomacy  mission.  Indeed,   Ngomba   (2012:58)   sees   Chinese   media   support   for   Zambia   more   as   ‘media-­‐focused  public  diplomacy’   rather   than  as  an   ‘ideological   commitment’.   Less  appreciated   is   the   fact   that  African  media   can   themselves   serve   as   platforms   for   Chinese   public   diplomacy   in   Africa.   This  
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media-­‐based  public  diplomacy   is  seen   in   the  case  of   the  Chinese  ambassador’s   interviews  with  Zambian  media  as  well  as  the  coverage  of  several  Zambian  elites  in  full  praise  of  China.  Indeed,  the   content  analysis   in   this   study  sustains  our  earlier   literature   review   findings   that  economic  assistance  by  China   to   Zambia   is   the   source   of   Chinese   soft   power   (Yejoo  Kim  2013;   Jura   and  Kaluzynka  2013).  In  the  particular  context  of  this  study,  it  would  appear  that  efforts  are  made  to  ensure  that  as  many  of  Chinese  assistance  to  Zambia  are  reported  as  possible.      What  can  be  said  of  Zambian  Watchdog  reporting,  heavily  slanted  towards  pessimism?  In  their  critical   report,   the   Human   Rights   Watch   report   (2011)   mentioned   in   its   methodology   that   it  relied   in   part   on   journalistic   sources   in   painting   a   grim   picture   of   China   in   Zambia’s   mining  sector.  Sautman  and  Yan  (2013)  fault  the  Human  Rights  Watch  methodology  charging  that  in  an  apparently  premeditated  agenda,  the  advocacy  organisation  ‘sees  what  it  wants  to  see  and  thus  again   fosters   the   entirely   predictable   result   of   feeding   anti-­‐Chinese   sentiment   in   Zambia’.  Brautigam  (2009:151)  points  out  the  role  of  journalists  in  the  misrepresentations  over  the  2006  fall  out  between  Sata  and  Chinese  authorities.  This   is  a  perspective  analogous  with  Franks  and  Ribet’s  (2009:134)  argument  that  Sata’s  anti-­‐Chinese  political  campaign  platform  may  have  been  latched  on   to   forge  negativity   in  Western  media.  Against   this  background,   this  study   finds   that  Zambian  Watchdog  may  be  more   inclined  towards  a  Western  view  of  China   in  Africa   in  such  a  manner  as  to  regurgitate  some  of  the  suppositions  of  China’s  bashing  that  are  often  not  backed  by  fact.      It   will   be   important   going   forward   for   proper   audience   research   to   be   undertaken   to   prime  insights   that   the   internet   with   all   its   conveniences   can   never   reveal.   Not   even   the   fact   that  ‘internet  coverage  in  Zambia  is  relatively  high  by  African  standards’  (Jura  and  Kalusynska,  2013:  48)  replaces  the  efficacy  of  an  audience  dimension  to  a  perceptions  study  such  as  this.  Thus  this  article,  as  well  as  many  others  of  a  similar  nature,  must  be  considered  as  work  in  progress.  The  audience   survey   could   sample   not   only   Zambians   from   different   age,   social   and   geographical  cadres  but   also  media  practitioners  would   also  be   targeted   in   order   to  hold  up   today’s  China-­‐Zambia  relations  against  the  global  headline  grabbing  events  of  yesteryears.        References      Africa-­‐Asia   Confidential.   2013.   Africa   in   the   Driving   Seat.   Africa-­‐Asia   Confidential   7,   no.   1.  www.africa-­‐asia-­‐confidential.com.    Alden,  C.  2007.  China  in  Africa.  London.  Zed  Books.  Aljazeera.   2012.   People   and   Power:   King   Cobra   and   the   Dragon.  http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2012/01/20121484624797945.html.  Banda.  F.  2009.  China  in  the  African  Mediascape:  A  Critical  Injection.  Journal  of  African  Media    Studies  1,  no.  3,  343-­‐61.  Bloomberg.  2011.  Clinton  Chastises  China  on  iInternet,  African  ‘new  colonialism’.  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-­‐06-­‐11/clinton-­‐chastises-­‐china-­‐on-­‐internet-­‐african-­‐new-­‐colonialism.    Brautigam,  D.  2011.  Comments  on  ‘Winds  from  the  East’.  In  Perspectives  on  Emerging  Powers  in  Africa.  Fahamu,  5.    Brautigam,  D.  2010.  China,  Africa  and   the   International  Aid  Architecture.  African  Development  Bank  Group  Working  Paper  Series,  no.  107,  April  2010.  British   Broadcasting   Corporation.   2012.   The   Chinese   are   Coming.   March   2011.  www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00ykxg9.    Carmody,   P.,   et   al.   2012.   Globalization   and   the   Rise   of   the   State?   Chinese   Geogoverance   in  Zambia.  New  Political  Economy  17,  no.  2,  209-­‐29.    Eliassen,  I.  E.  2012.  Chinese  Investments  in  the  Zambian  Textile  and  Clothing  Industry  and  Their  Implications  for  Development.  M.  A.  Thesis,  Stellenbosch  University.    
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